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Abstract. It is very important for investors to understand the critical factors affecting the value of 
firms before making investments. In knowledge-based economy, the method for creating firm value 
transfers from traditional physical assets to intangible knowledge. As intangible assets value is an 
important part of firm value, valuation of intangible assets becomes a widespread topic of interest in 
the future of economy. This paper applies association rules, one data mining technique, to discover 
critical factors affecting firm value in Taiwan and to provide a more flexible model than the traditional 
regression method. Based on collecting related factors found in literature, the results indicate that 
R&D intensity, family, participation in management, pyramids, profitability, and dividend are the six 
important factors, in which some are consistent with significant important variables in prior literature, 
but most of them are unique for Taiwan, one emerging economy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The market value of a firm's shares ultimately reflects the value of all its net assets. In 
the industrial era, physical assets, such as land, capital, and labor are critical factors to 
judge a firm‟s value. However, in modern economies, the development of communication 
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technology, electronic commerce, and the internet makes these resources circulate around 
the world quickly, letting the knowledge-based economy era evolve (Abu-Musa, 2009). In 
addition, the value of the knowledge industry increases rapidly. Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004) indicate that knowledge 
economy is possession, distribution, production, and use of knowledge as a critical 
resource in economics. Therefore, the important successful factors for companies are the 
capability and the efficiency in creation, expansion, and application of knowledge 
(Kessels, 2001; Greenstein-Prosch et al., 2008; Flensburg, 2009). 
The method for creating firm value transfers from traditional physical production 
factors to intangible knowledge. In this situation, a large part of a firm's value may reflect 
its intangible assets. Not only consider the tangible assets, but also respect the power of 
intangible assets (i.e. the difference between the market value and book value of a 
company) when we evaluate a firm‟s value. (Chan et al., 2001; Eckstein, 2004)  
Intangible assets are firm‟s dynamic capability created by core competence and 
knowledge resource, including organization structure, employment expert skills, 
employment centripetal force, R&D innovation capability, customer size, famous brand, 
and market share. Many researchers (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Bukh et 
al., 2001; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2003) indicate that intangible assets also can be represented 
by intellectual capital (IC) of a company. They divide IC into human capital, structure 
capital, customer capital, organization capital, innovation capital, and process capital and 
focus on the measurements and components of intellectual capital in some specific 
industry.  
Other studies (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Lang et al., 2003; Gleason and Klock, 2006; 
Fukui and Ushijima, 2007) investigate various types of impact factors in intangible assets 
value. Gleason and Klock (2006) and Black et al., (2006) indicate that advertising and 
R&D expenditure are positively related to Tobin‟s Q a proxy for intangible firm value, but 
firm size has negative relation with it. Wiwattanakantang (2001) examines the effect of 
controlling shareholders including various type of controlling, participation in 
management, and pyramids on corporate value and find no significant evidences on 
Tobin‟s Q. Fukui and Ushijima (2007) investigate the industry diversification of the largest 
Japanese manufacturers. Regression results show that the average relationship between 
diversification and firm value is negative. However, research to date (Wiwattanakantang, 
2001; Lins, 2003; Black et al., 2006) provides mixed evidence on the various factors 
affecting the firm value.  
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Different studies, focusing on different domain problems, discover different factors that 
affect a firms‟ intangible value. This paper reviews related literature from diverse domains 
including accounting, finance, management, and marketing to understand six categories 
impact factors of firm value and use Association Rule (AR) (Sánchez et al., 2008) one of 
the data mining techniques to discover related factors for evaluating the value of firms in 
Taiwan. This is mainly because knowledge economy is a prevailing concept to accomplish 
in the developed countries and most emerging markets, including Taiwan and mainland 
China. However, there is no clear, in-depth understanding about what factors really affect 
the value of Taiwanese companies. In related work, the regression models usually assume 
that the relationship between dependent variables and independent variables are linear. In 
order to get deeper insight of firm value, this paper employs association rules, one data 
mining technique, to explore the relationship between firm value and other critical factors 
with no linear assumption.  
The findings of this paper support that association rules can be employed to extract 
some specific factors affecting the intangible values of firms in Taiwan including R&D 
intensity, family, participation in management, pyramid in ownership structure, 
profitability, and dividend. In addition, this work was compared and analyzed with prior 
literature. Because of rather limited regulations and disclosure in intangible capital, the 
financial reporting cannot always reflect intangible assets value. The problem with the 
traditional financial accounting framework is that the aforementioned reporting lacks the 
recognition of intangible capital value and hence, creates an information gap between 
insiders and outsiders (Vergauwen et al., 2007). As a result, we expect that the empirical 
results obtained from this study can provide useful information for investors or creditors to 
assess the investment opportunities or loans. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature about 
firm value and related to various impact factors. Section 3 describes the research 
methodology, and Section 4 presents the experimental results and discussion. Finally, a 
conclusion is provided in Section 5. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Intangible firm value 
With the arrival of knowledge-based economy era, the implementation and the 
application of knowledge and information technology have become the most crucial issues 
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and competitive advantages of every organization. The primary method for creating firm 
value is based on transferring from traditional physical production-factors to intangible 
knowledge (Eckstein, 2004).  
Intangible assets are firm‟s dynamic capability created by core competencies and 
knowledge resources, including organization structure, employment expert skills, 
employment centripetal force, R&D innovation capability, customer size, brand 
recognition, and market share. It represents the future growth opportunities and 
profitability toward firm value (Ittner, 2008). Therefore, when we evaluate a firm‟s value, 
we not only consider the tangible assets, but also we must especially respect the power of 
intangible assets in recent years (Chan et al., 2001; Eckstein, 2004). 
2.2 The impact factors of intangible firm value 
In order to understand the factors affecting intangible firm value, related relevant 
literature is considered. These factors can be further classified into six categories based on 
their specific features. To this end, we hope to identify which category or factor affect the 
firm‟s intangible values. In specific, these values are intangible capital, ownership 
structure, corporate governance, firm characteristic, industry characteristic, and reactions 
of analysts &-customers, respectively.  
2.2.1 Intangible capital  
Many empirical models (Rao et al., 2004; Black et al., 2006; Gleason and Klock, 2006; 
Fukui and Ushijima, 2007) use the firm value as a forward-looking performance measure. 
This value represents the market‟s valuation of the expected future stream of profits which 
are based on an assessment of the return that can be generated from a firm‟s tangible and 
intangible assets. Therefore, any intangible investment increases firm‟s value in the same 
fashion that tangible assets increase value. R&D and advertising expenses are viewed as 
investments which can increase a firm‟s intangible assets with predictably positive effects 
on future cash flow and firm value (Gleason and Klock, 2006). Each of them, over the past 
few decades, has had a strong impact on the relationship between firm performance and 
intangible capital stocks (Klock and Megna, 2000; Rao et al., 2004; Gleason and Klock, 
2006; Fukui and Ushijima, 2007) although the direction are not always consistent with the 
expected direction.  
2.2.2 Ownership structure 
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Unlike the companies in some developed countries (e.g. US, UK, and Japan), the firms 
in emerging countries including Taiwan are under single common administrative and 
financial control of few wealthy old families and their ownership is concentrated on family 
members (i.e. controlling shareholders) (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). 
Recently, Claessens et al., (2002) and La Porta et al., (2002) indicate that the voting rights 
of controlling shareholders are high or higher than their cash flow rights; hence, controlling 
shareholders could extract wealth from the firm, but only bear a little cost with holding low 
cash flow rights. In this situation, they could make decisions for entrenchment of minority 
shareholders‟ interest and let firm value decrease.  
One alternative to mitigate the problem of controlling shareholder entrenchment is to 
increase the controlling shareholder‟s cash flow capability (Fan and Wong, 2005). Higher 
cash flow in the firm means that it will cost more to reduce the value of the corporation and 
thus, entrench the minority shareholders‟ benefit. In addition, it accrues a complementary 
effect, which lets the agency‟s conflict occurred between controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders minimize, and consequently, the firm value increases (Claessens et 
al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002).  
In business groups, the situation of entrenchment is more serious (Morck and Yeung, 
2003; Silva et al., 2006) because of pyramid ownership structure, different kinds of stocks, 
and cross-shareholdings. By such structures, they make the gap between voting rights and 
cash flow rights larger and the incentive of entrenchment stronger, and then the value of 
firm decreases (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
2.2.3 Corporate governance 
When the agency problem arises in companies, which can affects firm value; corporate 
governance may play an important role (Lins, 2003). These monitoring mechanisms are 
usually based on the board of directors (Xie et al., 2003; Larcker et al., 2007). Because 
boards are charged with monitoring management to protect shareholders‟ interests, they 
avoid firm value being entrenched. Especially, the empirical evidence on the efficacy of the 
monitoring that outsiders provide (proxy for board independence) appears in many studies 
(Bhagat and Black, 2002; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003).  
Otherwise, large shareholders or institutional shareholders are other general monitoring 
mechanisms. Jung and Kwon (2002) and Lins (2003) show that institutions, external, or 
large non-management shareholder are incentivized to monitor their management and 
protect their assets. Wiwattanakantang (2001) indicates that firms with more than one 
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controlling shareholder have higher return on assets by monitoring each other to reduce 
agency cost, related to firms with no controlling shareholder.  
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) suggest that foreign exchange listing signals a firm‟s 
commitment to the higher disclosure standards prevailing in the market in which it lists. 
Board representatives for large foreign shareholders are presumably „„outsiders‟‟ who will 
not use their influence as board members to obtain benefits that do not accrue to other 
shareholders (Stulz, 1999). No matter ranking on the list in foreign exchange or foreign 
shareholders entry as owners, both of them will be expected to increase the value of the 
firm. 
2.2.4 Firm characteristics  
A firm‟s value may be affected directly or indirectly by factors related to the nature of 
the firm. Sales growth is a proxy for growth opportunities which increase firm value, but 
the firm size is likely to be inversely related to expected growth opportunities (Fukui and 
Ushijima, 2007). Rao et al., (2004) find that firms with higher growth opportunities have 
lower leverage. However, previous research (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990) shows 
that firms with higher leverage can enjoy a tax benefit because they can deduct the interest 
costs, which results in greater cash flow and thus a positive relationship with firm value. 
Capital intensity also affects firm value, because it is a proxy for investment opportunities. 
Although research expects that the positive relation between capital intensity and firm 
value, most of them provide insignificant or negative results. Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) indicate that if management forgoes investment projects as they are not able to 
obtain the necessary financing, the firm‟s Tobin‟s Q ratio may remain high since they 
undertake only positive net present value (NPV) projects. If a firm pays a dividend, it is less 
likely to be capital constrained and may thus have a lower Q.  
In general, a profitable firm triggers expectations among investors of higher cash flow 
potential and drives intangible value. Furthermore, there are evidences that higher 
intangible values are significantly associated with higher profitability (Rao et al., 2004). 
Older firms have better disclosure, more liquid trading, more attention from analysts, and 
more diversified activities leading to lower risk of financial distress and then higher firm 
value. However, younger firms may have more growth opportunities and likely be faster 
growing and perhaps more intangible asset intensive (Black et al., 2006). Diversification 
leads to lower risk of financial crisis and higher firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
indicate that industrial diversification is an outgrowth of agency problem between 
managers and shareholders, thus reducing value. Internationalization theory notes that 
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foreign direct investment occurs when a firm can increase its value by internationalizing 
markets from some of its intangible assets, such as production skills or consumer goodwill. 
On the other hand, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that multi-nationality is positively 
related to firm value.  
2.2.5 Industry characteristic 
The degree of industry concentration should affect the firm‟s relative bargaining power. 
When an industry is fragmented and concentration is low, the degree of competition in the 
industry is likely to be more intense and the firm‟s bargaining power is decreased. 
Therefore, prior research indicates that higher concentration can provide more market 
power which can lead to a higher firm value (Anderson et al., 2004). On the other hand, 
many literatures argue that a higher firm value reflects better market efficiency rather than 
market power. The effect of the concentration index on firm value is negative (Rao et al., 
2004).  
For the traditional manufacturing industry, land, capital, and labor are critical factors to 
judge a firm‟s value. However, in the knowledge-intensive industry (e.g. high-technology 
industry) knowledge and innovation are the dominating resources and are far more 
important than physical assets (Tseng and Goo, 2005). Therefore, intangible assets 
determine a large part of a firm's value. Klock and Megna (2000) show that in 
communications industry, the industry average Tobin‟s Q is in excess of ten. This means 
that the market value is about ten times higher than book value. But in traditional 
industries, most firms‟ Tobin‟s Q is nearly equal to one or less than one. Firm value varies 
by industry.  
2.2.6 Reactions of analysts and customers  
Lang et al., (2003) indicate that more analysts follow means that more information is 
available, the firm‟s information environment is better, and the cost of capital is reduced. 
Analysts are one of outside users of financial statements and own professional domain 
knowledge; therefore, improving firm value by increasing the cash flows that accrues to 
shareholders (Lang et al., 2003). However, the link for analyst to follow and the value is 
not necessarily positive. For example, if analysts primarily gather private information, their 
activities could actually increase cost of capital by raising transactions costs and 
discouraging uninformed investors from purchasing shares (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). Although such an effect on valuation might be offset by an increase in investor 
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interest, reduced uncertainty, and reduced agency conflicts within firms, the relation 
between analyst following and valuation is not clear.  
According to the marketing theory (e.g. Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of 
marketing), it is believed that the more a marketer of a firm understands about why and the 
way how a consumer behaves, the decision making process in general and the purchase 
decision or indecision in particular, the more likely the firm will be able to sell the intended 
products or services to the consumer. Consequently, increasing firm‟s market share will in 
turn, bring profitability, and thus affect the firm value. Black et al., (2006) and Morgan and 
Rego (2009) show that market share is positively related to Tobin‟s Q proxy for firm value.  
2.3 Summary 
As per prior literature and/or studies from different business disciplines including 
accounting, finance, management, and marketing, the above six categories as the 
influencing factors to firm value are classified and discussed. Different disciplines only put 
focus on some of these aforementioned impact factors. Therefore, this paper is the first 
attempt to aim at including all related factors affecting intangible firm values by using 
Taiwan data.  
In addition, the regression models adopted by many relevenat studies usually assume 
that the relationship between dependent variables and independent variables is linear. 
However, this assumption can be easily challenged. Consequently, the results are 
insignificant or mixed frequently in the prior studies. To overcome/remedy these problems, 
this paper employs association rules to explore the relationship between intangible firm 
value and critical factors with no linear assumptions.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Association rule  
The association rule (AR) was proposed by Agrawal et al., (1993), which is a 
well-known data mining technique. It is also known as knowledge extraction in databases. 
More specifically, it was first used to discover regularities between products in transaction 
data. The aim of data mining is to discover useful information or patterns in large databases 
containing thousands to millions of records, where conventional statistical analysis is not 
feasible (Berry and Linoff, 1997; Roiger and Geatz, 2003). AR is usually adopted to 
discover variables relationships in a given database, and each relationship (also known as 
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an association rule) may contain two or more variables. These relationships are found by 
analyzing the co-occurrences of variables in the database. Therefore, an association rule 
may be interpreted that when the variable A (i.e. antecedent) occurs in a database, the 
variable B (i.e. consequent) also occurs and is defined as an implication of the form A => B.  
By employing AR, there are two popular algorithms which can be used to analyze the data, 
such as the Apriori and GRI algorithms. The former is used to analyze nominal or dummy 
variables; however the latter can be used for dummy and continuous variables which are 
used massively in this paper.  
In addition, two measures are generally used to decide the usefulness of an association 
rule: support and confidence. The support of an association rule A => B is the percentage 
of A∪B. The confidence of an association rule A => B is the ratio of the number of A∪B 
to the number of A. Support measures how frequently an association rule occurs in the 
entire set, and confidence measures the reliability of a rule. In AR, rules are selected only 
if they satisfy both a minimum support and a minimum confidence threshold. In specific, 
the AR algorithm is iterative by nature. In each iteration i, it generates the candidate 
itemsets Ci of size i from the database of transactions and then counts these to see 
whether or not they are frequent (i.e. satisfy the minimum support threshold). Only those 
candidates that are frequent (denoted as Li) are used to generate candidate itemsets Ci+1 
for the next iteration. To generate the next set of Ci+1 candidates of size i+1, joins are 
made of frequent itemsets, Li, which is found in the previous iteration. A join may take 
place if two itemsets have i-1 items in common. Duplicate candidates are discarded after 
the join process is completed. This process stops when all Ci+1 candidates in the next 
iteration are not frequent. Following this, association rules are generated for every 
frequent itemset l for all the itemsets, Li. For every l, all nonempty subsets of l are 
generated. Next, for each nonempty subset s belonging to l, a rule of the form s ⇒ (l - s) 
is generated only if it satisfies the minimum confidence threshold. All the rules are 
guaranteed to satisfy the minimum support threshold since they are derived from itemsets 
that already satisfy this requirement (Goh and Ang, 2007). 
Although AR has been applied to empirical researches in many fields, application of 
association rules to analyze intangible firm value is very limited. In the firm value 
literature, the regression model as the conventional method is generally used for empirical 
investigations (Lang et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Black et al., 2006; Fukui and 
Ushijima, 2007). Unlike the regression model, AR is a non-parametric model without 
linear relationship assumption and pre-defined relationships between dependent variables 
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and independent variables. It is more flexible in model specification. Otherwise, AR 
discovers the relationships among a large set of variables. In other words, given a database 
of records, each containing two or more variables and their respective values, AR 
determines variable-value combinations that frequently occur. Similar to correlation 
analysis in which relationships between two variables are uncovered, AR is also used to 
extract variable relationships (Tsai and Chen, 2010). From the discussion above, this paper 
considers using AR to find out the affecting factors of intangible firm value for Taiwanese 
firms in particular as an emerging market.  
However, the extracted rules in AR should not be taken as a definitive model to describe 
the solution to the problem at hand, since the association rules are generated on the basis of 
frequency counts of variables in the data sets. The situation- “no knowledge about the 
domain being investigated”, is incorporated into the rule generation process. Consequently, 
a rule may or may not make sense, even if it has high support and confidence values (Goh 
and Ang, 2007). The AR process is thus, required to have a further discussion with a 
domain expert. To accomplish this, after using AR to find out the affecting factors, this 
paper will explore and discuss these affecting factors. 
 
3.2 Variables measurement  
3.2.1 Intangible Firm value -Tobin’s Q 
According to prior literature (La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Fukui and Ushijima, 
2007), Tobin's Q is always used as a proxy for firm value. However, Tobin's Q actually 
means the differences between the market value of a firm and the replacement cost of the 
tangible assets which is associated with the value of intangible assets. For this reason, the 
intangible firm value is considered as a proxy in this paper.  
The construction of the Tobin‟s Q involves more complicated issues and choices. The 
standard definition Q is the market value of all financial claims on the firm divided by the 
replacement cost of assets (Tobin, 1969). There are practical problems associated with 
implementing this definition because neither of these variables is observable. A standard 
approach to construct the numerator is to use the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of debt. Otherwise, the denominator is used by the book value of assets to 
replace the replacement cost which is not readily available. Many prior researches (e.g. 
Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Dadalt et al., 2003; Gleason and Klock, 2006) indicate that this is 
a good approximation because the correlation between such a series and an alternative 
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detailed adjustment to the book value of debt is around 98%. The modified function is 
shown as following: 
 
Q = (Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock) 
     / Book value of total assets          (1) 
 
When the Q ratio of firm is more than one, it represents that market firm value is greater 
than the book value of its assets. Hall (2001) and Anderson et al., (2004) indicate that this 
excess value is due to intangible assets value. In this paper, the Q is a dummy variable, 
taking the value of 1 if the Q ratio is more than 1 which means a firm owns higher 
intangible firm value, otherwise it is 0.  
3.2.2 Antecedent variables 
According to prior related literature, this paper uses R&D intensity and advertising 
intensity to proxy intangible capital. R&D intensity is measured by research and 
development expenditures to total assets, and advertising intensity is measured by 
advertising expenditures to total assets.  
In ownership structure variables, this study is similar to Wiwattanakantang (2001) by 
using three types of controlling shareholders: family, government, and foreign investor 
which are dummy variables, indicating if the firm has a controlling shareholder who is an 
individual, government, and a foreign investor, respectively. On the other hand, ownership 
structure variables include cash flow right measured by the cash flow right of controlling 
shareholders and divergence measured by using voting rights of controlling shareholders 
minus cash flow rights. In addition, the participation in management is a dummy variable, 
indicating if the controlling shareholder and his family are present among the management 
level. Nonparticipation in the management level is set equal to 1 if controlling shareholders 
are not in the management level. Management owners measured by cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholders who are also management, which is the pyramids dummy 
variable, indicating if there exists pyramids ownership structure and/or 
cross-shareholdings, and business group dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to one of the 100 largest business groups in Taiwan (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; 
Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Black et al., 2006). 
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In corporate governance variables, this paper uses board size measured by the number 
of directors on the board; board independence measured by the percentage of independent 
outsider directors; blockholder, a dummy variable is defined that if the percentage of shares 
of the second largest shareholder is more than 5% adapted by Jung and Kwon (2002) that 
the variable is 1, otherwise is 0; the multi control dummy variable, if the firm has more than 
one controlling shareholder as proxy for corporate governance mechanisms. This paper 
uses more than 10% voting right hold by shareholder to determine if company exist 
controlling shareholder including one or more than one (La Porta et al., 1999). Foreign 
listing is a dummy (value 1 for foreign listing, 0, otherwise) used to identify firms that are 
listed or traded on one or more foreign exchanges, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, USA 
OTC(ADRs). 
About firm characteristics variables, sale growth measured by growth rate in sales size 
measured by log total assets. We use the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm as a 
measure of leverage. In this paper, fixed capital (i.e. property plant and equipment) to total 
sales ratio is the measure of capital intensity. According to Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
we use a dividend dummy, which equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the current year to 
proxy for the ability to access markets. We calculate profitability as the ratio of net income 
to total assets. We use the years since establishment as a measurement of age. 
Diversification is measured by the number of subsidiary companies. We use the ratio of 
export sales to total sales as a continuous measure of multi-nationality in the paper, and 
export to name it. 
In industry characteristics variables, we measured concentration using the 
herfindahl–hirschman index (hhi), which is the sum of the squared market shares of the 
firms in the industry (Schmalensee, 1977; Anderson et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2004). Industry 
is a dummy variable for four-digit industries or two-digit industries traded on Taiwan stock 
exchange or gretai securities market. 
On the other hand, in reactions of analysts and customers variables, we use a number of 
analysts that report estimates for each firm to measure. Market share is measured by firm‟s 
share of total sales by all firms in the same four-digit industries or two-digit industries 
traded on the Taiwan stock exchange or gretai securities market. All the 30 variables are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Category  Variables Measurement Reference 
Intangible capital 
  R&D INTENSITY Research and development 
expenditures to total assets. 
Klock and Megna (2000), Allayannis 
and Weston (2001), Rao et al., 
(2004), Black et al., (2006), Gleason 
and Klock (2006), Fukui and 
Ushijima (2007). 
  ADVERTISING 
INTENSITY 
Advertising expenditures to total 
assets. 
Klock and Megna (2000), Allayannis 
and Weston (2001), Rao et al., 
(2004), Anderson et al., (2004) Black 
et al., (2006), Gleason and Klock 
(2006), Fukui and Ushijima (2007). 
Ownership structure 
  FAMILY Dummy variables; indicating if the 
firm has a controlling shareholder 
who is an individual or a family. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), La Porta 
et al., (2002). 
  GOVERNMENT Dummy variables; indicating if the 
firm has a controlling shareholder 
who is government. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), La Porta 
et al., (2002). 
  FOREIGN INVESTOR Dummy variables, indicating if the 
firm has a controlling shareholder 
who is a foreign investor or a 
company. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003), Black et al., 
(2006). 
  CASH FLOW RIGHT Cash flow right of controlling 
shareholders. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Claessens 
et al., (2002), La Porta et al., (2002), 
Black et al., (2006). 
  DIVERGENCE Voting rights of controlling 
shareholders minus cash flow rights. 
Claessens et al., (2002), La Porta et 
al., (2002). 
  PARTICIPATION IN 
MANAGEMENT 
Dummy variable; indicating if the 
controlling shareholder and his 
family are present among 
management. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Lins 
(2003). 
  NONPARTICIPATION 
IN MANAGEMENT 
If controlling shareholders are not 
management the variable is 1; 
otherwise is 0. 
Lins (2003). 
  MANAGEMENT 
OWNERS 
Cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders who are also 
management. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Lins 
(2003). 
  PYRAMIDS Dummy variable; indicating if there 
exists pyramids ownership structure 
and/or cross-shareholdings. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Lins 
(2003). 
Table 1. The factors affecting firm value 
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Category  Variables Measurement Reference 
  BUSINESS GROUP Dummy variable; taking the value of 
1 if the firm belongs to one of the 100 
largest business groups in Taiwan. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Black et 
al., (2006). 
Corporate governance 
  BOARD SIZE The number of directors on the 
board. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Xie et 
al., (2003). 
  BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
The percentage of independent 
outsider directors. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Xie et 
al., (2003). 
  BLOCKHOLDER Dummy variable defined that if the 
percentage of shares of the second 
largest shareholder is more than 5%. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Lins 
(2003). 
  MULTI CONTROL Dummy variable, if the firm has 
more than one controlling 
shareholder. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), Lins 
(2003). 
  FOREIGN LISTING Dummy variables; identify firms that 
are listed or traded on one or more 
foreign exchanges. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Lang 
et al., (2003), Black et al., (2006). 
Firm characteristics 
  SALE GROWTH Growth rate in sales. Wiwattanakantang (2001), Claessens 
et al., (2002), La Porta et al., (2002), 
Lang et al., (2003), Klapper and 
Love (2004), Rao et al., (2004), 
Black et al., (2006), Fukui and 
Ushijima (2007). 
  SIZE The log of total assets. Wiwattanakantang (2001), 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Claessens et al., (2002), Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003), Lang et al., 
(2003), Lins (2003), Klapper and 
Love (2004), Gleason and Klock 
(2006), Black et al., (2006), Fukui 
and Ushijima (2007). 
  LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets. Wiwattanakantang (2001), 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Lins 
(2003), Rao et al., (2004), Black et 
al., (2006), Fukui and Ushijima 
(2007). 
  CAPITAL INTENSITY The ratio of fixed capital (i.e. 
property plant and equipment) to 
total sales. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Claessens et al., (2002), Lins (2003), 
Klapper and Love (2004), Black et 
al., (2006). 
  DIVIDEND Dummy variable; which equals 1 if 
the firm paid a dividend in the current 
year. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001). 
Table 1 The factors affecting firm value (continuation) 
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Category  Variables Measurement Reference 
  PROFITABILITY The ratio of net income to total 
assets. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Lang 
et al., (2003), Rao et al., (2004), 
Black et al., (2006). 
  AGE The years since establishment. Wiwattanakantang (2001), Claessens 
et al., (2002), Oxelheim and Randoy 
(2003), Gompers et al., (2003), Rao 
et al., (2004), Black et al., (2006). 
  DIVERSIFICATION The number of subsidiary 
companies. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Fukui and Ushijima (2007). 
  EXPORT The ratio of export sales to total sales. Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Black et al., (2006). 
Industry characteristics 
  CONCENTRATION The sum of the squared market shares 
of the firms in the industry. 
Anderson et al., (2004), Rao et al., 
(2004). 
  INDUSTRY Dummy variable for four-digit or 
two-digit industries traded on Taiwan 
stock exchange or Gretai securities 
market. Contain thirty two industries.  
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Lang 
et al., (2003), Lins (2003). 
Reactions of analysts and customers 
  ANALYST 
FOLLOWING 
The number of analysts that report 
estimates for each company. 
Lang et al., (2003), Gompers et al., 
(2003). 
  MARKET SHARE Firm‟s share of total sales by all firms 
in the same four-digit industries or 
two-digit industries. 
Anderson et al., (2004), Black et al., 
(2006), Morgan and Rego (2009). 
Table 1. The factors affecting firm value (continuation) 
 
 
3.3 Sample selection 
Nowadays, knowledge economy is prevailing in developed countries and emerging 
markets, including Taiwan and mainland China. Taiwan and China share the same culture 
and celebrate the same holidays, and many private enterprises in China are invested by 
Taiwan enterprises. For example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd. directly 
invests USD$ 371,000 thousand dollars in TSMC Shanghai in Shanghai. End in 2008, the 
accumulated investment of Formosa Plastics Corporation in China is USD$ 398,770 
thousand dollars.  
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In this paper, we use sample firms from manifold industries in Taiwan except regulated 
utilities and financial institutions due to the unique aspects of their regulatory 
environments. We hope to take the Taiwan economy as a lesson and learn some lessons 
about the business practice for applying to Chinese cases.  
In order to increase the accessibility of the sample data and avoid the influence of 
different fiscal year-ends, this study considers only listed companies with December 31 
fiscal year-ends and collects from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The 
controlling shareholder‟s ownership structure data is accessed from corporate governance 
database and the financial data it received from financial database in TEJ. The period of the 
data is from 1996 to 2007. After excluding missing data, in total, 9,027 observations are 
used for the final analysis. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of variables for the overall samples. The 
consequent variable, Tobin‟s Q, indicates that about two-third sample companies own 
intangible firm value. In antecedent variables, the average of R&D intensity is 1.974%, 
higher than the advertising intensity which is 0.403%. For the ownership structure 
variables, most of the sample companies are controlled by family members, exist pyramids 
construct, and most controlling shareholders participate in management since their Q1 
value is 1. These results are consistent with the findings from prior literature (Claessens et 
al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003; Silva et al., 2006).  
In terms of corporate governance variables, most companies do not own these 
monitoring mechanisms, since the medians of board independence, blockholder, multi 
control, and foreign listings are 0. About 70% companies pay dividend in accordance with 
dividend variables. The average and median age of samples are about twenty-three and 
twenty-one years, respectively. The diversification variable indicates that one company has 
3.5 subsidiary companies in average. Most of the sample companies do not have any 
analyst to report and analyze their information.  Further, the industry variable (not detailed 
in Table 2) includes 32 industries in Taiwan. 
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Variables Average St. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Tobin's Q 0.669  0.470  0  0  1  1  1  
R&D INTENSITY 1.974  3.200  0  0  0.818  2.533  39.868  
ADVERTISING INTENSITY 0.403  1.215  0  0  0.023  0.265  25.002  
FAMILY 0.859  0.348  0  1  1  1  1  
GOVERNMENT 0.020  0.141  0  0  0  0  1  
FOREIGN INVESTOR 0.004  0.065  0  0  0  0  1  
CASH FLOW RIGHT 23.769  16.897  0  10.290  20.335  34.165  97.750  
DIVERGENCE 5.529  9.987  0  0  1.280  5.930  81.360  
PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT 0.738  0.439  0  1  1  1  1  
NONPARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT 0.262  0.439  0  0  0  1  1  
MANAGEMENT OWNERS 3.563  5.354  0  0  1.240  5.210  46.350  
PYRAMIDS 0.963  0.189  0  1  1  1  1  
BUSINESS GROUP 0.703  0.457  0  0  1  1  1  
BOARD SIZE 7.047  2.863  2  5  7  8  27  
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 9.367  14.756  0  0  0  22.222  66.667  
BLOCKHOLDER 0.277  0.447  0  0  0  1  1  
MULTI CONTROL 0.047  0.212  0  0  0  1  1  
FOREIGN LISTING 0.044  0.205  0  0  0  0  1  
SALE GROWTH 15.270  76.790  -197.400  -5.403  7.345  23.845  3897.660  
SIZE 6.583  0.568  5.018  6.178  6.519  6.903  8.793  
LEVERAGE 40.035  17.245  1.550  27.600  39.620  50.710  307.380  
CAPITAL INTENSITY 11.203  317.175  -15.377  0.673  2.349  7.329  30022.682  
DIVIDEND 0.690  0.462  0  0  1  1  1  
PROFITABILITY 3.771  11.462  -249.945  0.570  4.452  9.007  58.359  
AGE 22.967  11.758  1  14  21  31  62  
DIVERSIFICATION 3.535  3.553  0  1  3  5  41  
EXPORT 59.251  1026.070  0.000  3.952  41.623  78.362  72128.073  
CONCENTRATION 1248.915  1190.441  310.481  514.859  787.726  1571.453  9884.513  
ANALYST FOLLOWING 0.649  0.899  0  0  0  1  5  
MARKET SHARE 3.241  7.022  0  0.277  0.925  2.955  99.419  
 
Table 2. The descriptive statistics of variables 
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4.2 The result of association rule 
4.2.1 Main results 
The GRI algorithm is implemented by Clementine, a commercial data mining software 
product, as some antecedent variables are continuous variables (SPSS, 2005). Sliding 
support and confidence values are used, starting initially at 80% and reducing 10% 
gradually until the final threshold value of 30% is reached or none of the rule arisen. The 
number of rules of the antecedent variables is limited to 5 to simplify the rule (Goh and 
Ang, 2007), and the number of association rule is determined in the maximum value 100.  
In this paper, association rules are generated to determine the critical factors affecting 
intangible firm value. We decide two higher support and confidence threshold values (50% 
/ 80% and 50% / 70%) as the representative result shown in Table 3. The Panel A of Table 
3 shows the result of 50% / 80% (i.e. support / confidence) including 5 association rules. 
The result indicates that profitability, pyramids, family, and participation in management 
are critical factors affecting intangible firm value. Especially, profitability > 4.429 toward 
1 of Tobin‟s Q, which means the firm has higher intangible firm value owns the highest 
confidence and this rule is found in 89% of sample firms. The result provides that when the 
company‟s ROA is higher than 4.429, it may own higher intangible firm value. In addition, 
profitability is also a critical factor from the second to the fifth rules. The second rule 
indicates that if a firm owns pyramids ownership structure and/or cross-shareholdings and 
profitability > 4.202 then the firm has or has higher intangible firm value. This result 
provides that besides profitability, pyramids ownership structure will further affect firm‟s 
intangible firm value. Furthermore, a controlling shareholder who is an individual, or the 
controlling shareholder and his/her family are present among management are another  
affecting factors in the third and the fifth association rule with higher confidence and 
support, respectively. As a result, we can find out four critical factors affecting intangible 
value of a firm. 
On the other hand, the lower value of support and confidence, the lager the number of 
rules generated, holding other parameters constant (Goh and Ang, 2007). Therefore, in 
Panel B, the result contains 7 association rules. Among them, the first five rules are the 
same as Panel A and the sixth rule also owns similar affecting factors. However, in the 
seventh rule, R&D intensity is a new and unique appearance. It indicates that when firms 
invest in R&D intensity more than 0.811%, it will influence intangible firm value 
significantly. In this rule, R&D is the only one factor which affects intangible firm value 
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with higher confidence and support. Therefore, this result indicates that R&D intensity is 
also another critical affecting factor. Besides these five factors, in order to find out other 
critical factors affecting intangible firm value, this paper tries many models to verify the 
results, and shows them in Table 4.  
No. Association Rule Support Confidence 
Panel A* (The number of association rules: 5) 
1 PROFITABILITY > 4.429 => Q 50.15% 89.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 4.202 => Q 50.04% 88.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.349 => Q 50.02% 84.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.097 => Q 50.01% 84.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PROFITABILITY > 2.013 => Q 50.01% 81.00% 
Panel B**(The number of association rules: 7) 
1 PROFITABILITY > 4.429 => Q 50.15% 89.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 4.202 => Q 50.04% 88.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.349 => Q 50.02% 84.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.097 => Q 50.01% 84.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PROFITABILITY > 2.013 => Q 50.01% 81.00% 
6 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 1.573 => Q 50.01% 80.00% 
7 R&D INTENSITY >0.811 => Q 50.09% 78.00% 
*Support threshold value is 50%; Confidence threshold value is 80%. 
**Support threshold value is 50%; Confidence threshold value is 70%. 
Table 3. Support and Confidence for association rules 
Regarding Table 4, the results are consistent with prior literature, and the generated 
association rules are dependent on the minimum support and confidence threshold values. 
Therefore, when these values become larger, the number of rules generated decreases. The 
results of all test threshold values in this paper are similar to the above result that the 
appearance number of critical factors is either large or persistent. For instance, for 30% / 
30% rules, there are 42 association rules and then profitability appears 40 times. This result 
shows that profitability presents in 40 association rules and the results are similar in other 
threshold values. Besides, other critical factors, such as pyramids, family, participation in 
management, and R&D intensity almost present in all threshold values. These results 
indicate that profitability pyramids, family, participation in management, and R&D 
intensity are also critical factors affecting intangible firm value indeed. On the other hand, 
dividend exists in each model with lower support, the reason may be because there are less 
sample companies pay dividend shown in Table 2. However, it not only appears persistent, 
but also exists in the first five association rules of the model with different confidence 
values (i.e. from low to high) shown partially in Table 5 . The result shows that dividend 
may be another important factor. Therefore, in summary, we can find out six critical factors 
affecting intangible firm value from our sample including R&D intensity, family, 
participation in management, pyramids, profitability, and dividend.  
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support/ confidence 30/30 30/40 30/50 30/60 30/70 30/80 40/20 40/30 40/40   
Number* 42 42 42 23 16 16 30 30 30   
R&D INTENSITY 3** 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2   
FAMILY 27 27 28 12 6 6 13 13 13   
CF RIGHT 12 12 12 3     8 8 8   
DIVERGENCE 2 2 2       2 2 2   
PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT 14 14 14 6 5 5 4 4 4   
MANAGEMENT OWNERS 2 2 2       2 2 2   
PYRAMIDS 21 21 21 10 6 6 15 15 15   
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 21 21 21 4     15 15 15   
SALE GROWTH 1 1 1 1 1 1         
PROFITABILITY 40 40 40 21 14 14 28 28 28   
DIVIDEND 5 5 5 5 5 5         
                      
support/ confidence 40/50 40/60 40/70 40/80 50/30 50/40 50/50 50/60 50/70 50/80 
Number* 30 15 9 8 11 11 11 7 7 5 
R&D INTENSITY 2 1 1   1 1 1 1 1   
FAMILY 13 8 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CF RIGHT 8 6     1 1 1       
DIVERGENCE 2                   
PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 
MANAGEMENT OWNERS 2                   
PYRAMIDS 15 7 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 2 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 15       3 3 3       
SALE GROWTH                     
PROFITABILITY 28 14 8 8 10 10 10 6 6 5 
DIVIDEND                     
           
*The number of association rule. 
**The number which appearance in all association rules. 
Table 4. The summary of results of all test threshold value in the paper 
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No. Association Rule Support Confidence 
Panel A
*
 (The number of association rules: 16) 
1 DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.792=> Q 35.29% 95.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.763 => Q 34.29% 95.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.794 => Q 30.86% 95.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 
6.763=> Q 
30.11% 95.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ DIVIDENT ^ 




(The number of association rules: 16) 
1 DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.792=> Q 35.29% 95.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.763 => Q 34.29% 95.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 6.794 => Q 30.86% 95.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ DIVIDENT ^PROFITABILITY > 
6.763=> Q 
30.11% 95.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ DIVIDENT ^ 
PROFITABILITY > 6.063 => Q 
30.89% 94.00% 
*
Support threshold value is 30%; Confidence threshold value is 80%. 
**
Support threshold value is 30%; Confidence threshold value is 70%. 
 
Table 5. Support and Confidence for association rules (the first five rules) 
 
4.2.2 Additional Test 
After reviewing related literature, Allayannis and Weston (2001) provide that if the 
management is hedgers, they would use foreign currency or derivative financial products to 
avoid the risk, and then affect the intangible firm value. Therefore, we add the hedger 
dummy variable, indicating if the firm uses any financial techniques to avoid the risk as 
another antecedent variable in additional test. Otherwise, since the data of hedger is 
unavailable in the database of Taiwan before the year of 2005, the final samples are 
reduced to 1,789 observations, and hence, the period used is from 2005 to 2007. Even 
adding the hedger variable will decrease the sample size, we can still verify the result from 
different periods by additional test. Similar to the main results, we present the results 
extracted from AR with first two highest support and confidence threshold values (50% / 
80% and 50% / 70%) shown in Table 6 and then, summarize the results of all threshold 
values in Table 7. The results indicate that the new variable hedger never exists in any 
association rule and is not an important factor affecting intangible firm value. Otherwise, 
although divergence exists in the 50% / 70% rule or other threshold values the appearance 
number is either less or not persistent. From the above discussion, it is not an important 
factor. Similar to the main results, profitability, pyramids, family, participation in 
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management, and R&D intensity almost present in all threshold values and dividend exists 
in the first several rules. Therefore, the critical factors are similar to prior main results 
including R&D intensity, family, participation in management, pyramids, profitability, and 
dividend. 
No. Association Rule Support Confidence 
Panel A
*
 (The number of association rules: 7) 
1 PROFITABILITY > 5.292 => Q 50.06% 91.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 5.165 => Q 50.11% 91.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ PROFITABILITY > 4.020 => Q 50.00% 85.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.945 => Q 50.00% 85.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PROFITABILITY 
> 2.149 => Q 
50.00% 82.00% 
6 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PYRAMIDS ^ 
PROFITABILITY > 1.866 => Q 
50.00% 81.00% 
7 R&D INTENSITY >0.773 => Q 50.62% 81.00% 
Panel B
**
(The number of association rules: 8) 
1 PROFITABILITY > 5.292 => Q 50.06% 91.00% 
2 PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 5.165 => Q 50.11% 91.00% 
3 FAMILY ^ PROFITABILITY > 4.020 => Q 50.00% 85.00% 
4 FAMILY ^ PYRAMIDS ^ PROFITABILITY > 3.945 => Q 50.00% 85.00% 
5 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PROFITABILITY 
> 2.149 => Q 
50.00% 82.00% 
6 PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT ^ PYRAMIDS ^ 
PROFITABILITY > 1.866 => Q 
50.00% 81.00% 
7 R&D INTENSITY >0.773 => Q 50.62% 81.00% 
8 DIVERGENCE >0.135 ^ PROFITABILITY > 2.287 => Q 50.06% 81.00% 
*
Support threshold value is 50%; Confidence threshold value is 80%. 
**
Support threshold value is 50%; Confidence threshold value is 70%. 
Table 6. Support and Confidence for association rules-Additional test 
 
4.3 Discussion 
4.3.1 The critical factors from Taiwan 
From the sample firms in Taiwan, this paper discovers six critical factors with either 
persistent appearance in difference threshold value model or emergence in the first 
association rule of the model. The variables are R&D intensity, family, participation in 
management, pyramids, profitability, and dividend, respectively. After comparing the 
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results with prior related researches, we can see that some critical variables are also 
significantly important variables in prior literature, but the majority is not in our case.  
support/ confidence 30/30 30/40 30/50 30/60 30/70 30/80 40/30 40/40 40/50 
Number* 28 28 27 25 20 19 27 27 27 
R&D INTENSITY 1** 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
FAMILY 11 11 11 9 7 7 15 15 15 
CF RIGHT 2 2 2             
DIVERGENCE             2 2 2 
PARTICIPATION IN  
11 11 10 10 7 5 6 6 6 MANAGEMENT 
MANAGEMENT OWNERS 5 5 5 5 5   1 1 1 
PYRAMIDS 15 15 14 13 13 10 13 13 13 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 4 4 3 3 3 3 9 9 9 
SALE GROWTH 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 
PROFITABILITY 23 23 22 20 20 15 25 25 25 
DIVIDEND 12 12 12 12 10 10 5 5 5 
support/ confidence 40/60 40/70 40/80 50/30 50/40 50/50 50/60 50/70 50/80 
Number* 16 16 14 9 9 9 8 8 7 
R&D INTENSITY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FAMILY 8 7 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CF RIGHT                   
DIVERGENCE 1 2   1 1 1 1 1   
PARTICIPATION IN  
6 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 MANAGEMENT 
MANAGEMENT OWNERS 1 4               
PYRAMIDS 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE       1 1 1       
SALE GROWTH                   
PROFITABILITY 15 15 13 8 8 8 7 7 6 
DIVIDEND 5 5 5             
*The number of association rule. **The number which appearance in all association rules. 
Table 7. The summary of results of all test threshold value-Additional test 
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Generally, a profitable firm is expected to have higher cash flow and can drive 
intangible value by investors, and then influence investors to assess the firm. However, in 
prior literature, most studies have no significant association between profitability and 
intangible firm value (e.g. Lang et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006). Through the data mining 
technique, we discover that profitability is an important factor because of its persistent 
occurrence in the model with different threshold values and also the appearance in the first 
association rule of the models. Further, although few literatures examine the relation 
between dividend and firm value, we find that if a firm pays dividends, it is an important 
reference for investors to evaluate the firm. This is simply because it appears in the first 
association rule of the models. 
The mass of prior studies (Black et al., 2006; Fukui and Ushijima, 2007) provide that 
R&D investment has statistically significant positive effects on future cash flow and firm 
value. These results show that in a knowledge-based economy, enormous competitive 
pressure always push the firms to produce innovation products through investing more and 
more R&D expenditures, and then create larger market and meet more consumer's 
demands. Similar to majority related literature, the result of this paper indicate that R&D 
intensity is associated with Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for intangible firm value. It means that 
innovation is an important factor affecting intangible firm value in knowledge economy.  
Unlike the companies in some developed countries which have widely dispersed 
ownership, developing countries are under single common administrative and financial 
control of few wealthy old families and their ownership is concentrated in family members. 
Therefore, the discussion of agency problem from family controlling shareholder always 
appears in emerging countries researches (e.g. Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Morck and Yeung, 2003), although some results of studies are not significant. Claessens et 
al., (2000) provide about half of the sample firms of Taiwan pyramids, and 79.8% firms 
indicate that the controlling shareholder and their respective family‟s are present among 
management. Otherwise, the firms have a controlling shareholder who is an individual or 
family member with about 65.6% of sample firm. These results show that the problems 
from controlling shareholder may exist in many firms and influence firm value. Therefore, 
among the ten ownership structure variables we find out family, participation in 
management, and pyramids are more important variables affecting intangible firm value. 
Summary of the above discussion: the six variables are critical factors influencing 
intangible value of firms in Taiwan. Some are consistent with prior literature, but some are 
difference. Therefore, we expect that the empirical results can provide other information 
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for investors or creditors not only in Taiwan, but also in other emerging countries including 
China when they evaluate intangible value of firm. 
4.3.2 Difference from prior literature 
According to the results, we can find that the antecedent variables belong to corporate 
governance, industry characteristics, and reactions of analysts and customers are less or 
never occur in association rules. Fan and Wong (2005) indicate that the conventional 
corporate control systems (e.g. boards of directors and institutions) in developing countries 
do not have a strong governance function, since they have weaker legal environments. 
Therefore, in these countries, outside corporate control system (e. g. auditors) may play a 
more critical role for corporate governance, and then conventional corporate control 
systems may not be more important in emerging countries.  
Otherwise, the industry characteristics and reactions of analysts and customers are not 
related to intangible firm value. Industry situation and reaction of customers could give 
management some advice. When they want to increase intangible firm value they may pay 
much attention to produce high value-added products or to care about industry trend, not 
focus on extending the market share only. The unimportance of the analyst variable may 
vary since the analysts focus on “big corporations” which may not be a firm with high 
intangible firm value when they forecast. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
With the arrival of knowledge-based economy era, the implementation and the 
application of knowledge and information technology have become the most crucial issue 
and competitive advantage of every organization. Because of the method for creating firm 
value transfers from traditional physical assets to intangible knowledge, it is commonly 
found that the market values of knowledge based firms are much higher than the book 
values. Therefore, valuation of intangible assets value becomes a widespread topic of 
interest in the new economy.  
This paper aims at understanding the determinants of intangible firm value in Taiwan. 
In particular, related literature is reviewed over various domains and six categories of 
impact factors of intangible firm value are found including Intangible capital, Ownership 
structure, Corporate governance, Firm characteristics, Industry characteristics, and 
Reactions of analysts and customers. Next, a data mining technique, association rules, is 
applied to discover critical factors affecting the intangible firm value in Taiwan. The results 
80   The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                Vol. 10 
 
indicate R&D intensity, and then family, participation in management, pyramid in 
ownership structure, otherwise, profitability, and dividend are important antecedent 
variables for Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for intangible firm value.  
After comparing the results of prior researches, we find out that R&D intensity is 
consistent with prior literature (Rao et al., 2004; Gleason and Klock, 2006; Black et al., 
2006; Fukui and Ushijima, 2007). However, family, participation in management and 
pyramid are unique factors for emerging countries. On the other hand, profitability and 
dividend are verified to be important factors affecting intangible firm value. 
Data mining techniques have been applied in many business fields, but none was 
utilized in assessing the intangible firm value. In addition, for these aforementioned 
studies, AR is usually employed to discover the relationships between a large set of 
variables. This paper considers using AR to find out the affecting factors of intangible firm 
value especially for the firms in Taiwan as one example of the emerging markets. It is 
authors‟ belief that this proposed method can provide a more flexibility than traditional 
statistics method can. However, no knowledge about the investigated domain in general is 
incorporated into the association rule generation process. Consequently, a rule may or may 
not make sense, even if it has high support and confidence values. The AR process thus, 
requires further discussion with a domain expert. In sum, after using AR to find out the 
affecting factors, this paper discusses these affecting factors and hope these empirical 
results and discussion can provide newer insights for investors or creditors to help them 
asess the investment opportunities or loans. 
Although we have tried to collect as many related important factors as possible in all 
kinds of business disciplines in recent years, some variables might be missing. For future 
work, more new and related literature or minor factors found in related studies could be 
incorporated to conduct the analysis. In addition, other feature selection methods, such as 
decision trees and genetic algorithms can also be applied to compare with the selected 
variables of AR in order to make a more reliable conclusion.  
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